Pregnancy and Unemployment: Problems and Solutions? by Brown, Mark R.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 28
1995 
Pregnancy and Unemployment: Problems and Solutions? 
Mark R. Brown 
Stetson University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Social Welfare 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark R. Brown, Pregnancy and Unemployment: Problems and Solutions?, 28 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 13 
(1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol28/iss5/7 
 
This Symposium Abstract is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PREGNANCY AND UNEMPLOYMENT: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS? 
Mark R. Brown 
OVERVIEW 
Unemployment laws vary from state to state, but all follow 
the same basic · theme. An involuntary separation from 
employment (firing) normally is compensable under the un-
employment laws while a voluntary separation (quitting) is 
not. Exceptions exist; misconduct and unavailability for work 
disqualify even an involuntarily discharged claimant from 
receiving benefits. Even a voluntary separation is compen-
sable if the claimant had "good cause" for quitting and 
remains willing and able to work. 
Pregnancy-related firings are not only suspect under fed-
eral 1 and state anti-discrimination laws, but also most, if not 
all, state unemployment laws. With the Supreme Court's 
decision in Turner v. Department of Employment Security2 
and the adoption of section 3304(12) of the Federal Un-
employment Tax Act (FUTA)3 the following year, it became 
clear that states' unemployment laws could not single out 
pregnancy for unfavorable treatment. Discriminatory state 
laws that proliferated prior to 1975 were ostensibly rendered 
ineffective.4 States were left free, however, to treat pregnancy 
the same as any other temporary disability. Because one 
often is disqualified from benefits during a period of dis-
ability, being unavailable to work, unemployment benefits 
are likely to be interrupted during or immediately after the 
pregnancy-even if the claimant was fired because bf her 
pregnancy. 
Voluntary pregnancy-related separations are not com-
pensable under the unemployment laws of at least twenty-
1. Tit le VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S .C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). 
2. 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 
3. 26 u.s.c. § 3304(12) (1988). 
4. See Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Beyond: Analyzing the Refusal to 
Award Unemployment Compensation to Women Who Terminate Prior Employment 
Due to Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532 (1988). 
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one jurisdictions. Reasons vary, but more often than not the 
state's unemployment law specifically requires that good 
cause be "attributable to" or "connected with" employment. 
Because pregnancy is neither "attributable to" nor "connected 
with" employment, benefits are denied regardless of whether 
the pregnancy otherwise amounts to good cause. As explained 
by the Supreme Court in Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial 
Relations Commission of Missouri,5 excluding pregnancy is 
permissible so long as all other non-occupational illnesses 
and disabilities are treated similarly. 
Of those states not disqualifying pregnancy altogether, only 
a handful afford immediate unemployment benefits, and then 
only if the claimant's separation was medically necessary. 
These states also commonly require that the claimant remain 
available for other work-a difficult standard to meet if health 
is what caused the separation in the first place. Texas law, for 
example, provides that "an individual who is [otherwise] 
available to work may not be disqualified for benefits because 
the individual left work because of: (1) a medically verified 
illness ... ; (2) injury; (3) disability; or (4) pregnancy."6 
The most common approach among those states allowing 
benefits, followed in about sixteen jurisdictions, provides 
unemployment benefits after childbirth when the mother again 
makes herself available for employment. In effect, the claimant 
is required to take an unpaid disability/maternity leave, with 
unemployment benefits being available only if the former job 
does not remain open. Missouri, for example, amended its 
unemployment insurance law in response to Wimberly so as not 
to disqualify a claimant who 
presents evidence supported by competent medical proof 
that she was forced to leave her work because of pregnancy, 
notified her employer of such necessity as soon as practical 
under the circumstances, and returned to that employer 
and offered her services to that employer as soon as she 
was physically able to return to work, as certified by a 
licensed and practicing physician, but in no event later 
than ninety days after the termination of the pregnancy.7 
5. 479 U.S. 511 (1987). 
6. TEXAS LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.045(d) (West 1995) (emphasis added). 
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.050 l.(l)(c) (Supp. 1993). 
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Of those jurisdictions that do not address pregnancy, do not 
explicitly provide for disability leave, and do not require a 
connection between good cause and employment, four likely 
would hold that disability or illness amounts to good cause 
under certain circumstances. Because equal treatment is 
mandated by FUTA, unemployment benefits also would need 
to be made available for pregnancy in these states. The almost 
universal "availability" requirement, however, likely would 
postpone unemployment benefits until after childbirth. 
In sum, a substantial minority of jurisdictions altogether 
deny unemployment benefits for pregnant workers who volun-
tarily quit. Although an award of benefits is possible in most 
jurisdictions, the claimant is required either to be "available" 
for other work or to take an unpaid maternity leave. The result 
in either situation is that benefits often are available only post-
partum. 
I. AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE OF THE SYSTEM: 
GENDER BIAS AND F AVORITlSM 
Because most employers would rather not pay any un-
employment benefits and would like to avoid potential liability 
under the anti-discrimination laws, few are willing to admit to 
discharging a worker because of her pregnancy. Employers 
naturally are encouraged to dissemble and argue either that 
the claimant was justifiably discharged or quit. A composite of 
factors, including agency favoritism for employers and gender 
bias, creates a serious risk that discharged pregnant claimants 
will be wrongly denied benefits. Viewed under its own terms, 
then, the current unemployment laws modeled on the anti-
discrimination principle can fail pregnant workers. 
To illustrate, cons'ider the case of Jenny Brown v. Kentucky 
Unemployment Insurance Commission. Jenny worked for her 
employer for over two years before becoming pregnant; she was 
separated from her employment within four months of becom-
ing pregnant. Jenny claimed that her employer unilaterally 
reduced her hours, hired a new employee, transferred her 
duties to the new employee, and warned her not to complain 
to the EEOC. The employer, meanwhile, argued that Jenny's 
reduced hours had nothing to do with her pregnancy and that 
Jenny inexplicably quit work one day for no reason. Not-
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withstanding documentation signed by the employer that 
Jenny's hours and duties were being transferred to the new 
employee "because of [Jenny's] condition," Jenny was found by 
an unemployment hearing officer to have voluntarily quit 
without good cause. 
Two months after this denial of benefits, Jenny, still 
pregnant and in need of income, located part-time, temporary 
employment through a placement service. Needless to say the 
job paid substantially less than Jenny previously earned. 
Within weeks o( beginning this part-thne job1 Jenny's appeal 
of the hearing officer's decision proved successful; she was 
awarded full benefits retroactive to the date of her separation. 
Because of her pregnancy, the part-time nature of her current 
job, its lower pay and lack of benefits, and the award of un-
e;mployment benefits from the previous job, Jenny did not 
return to her part-time employment. Because Jenny was close 
to term and her assigned duties were informal, her part-time 
employer assumed that she took maternity leave when she 
failed to report for work. Only after Jenny's delivery did the 
employer learn that she would not return to work, and at this 
time the employer reported her as a voluntary quit. 
Becm;1se it viewed her separation from her most recent part-
time employment as a voluntary quit, the Unemployment 
Division again disqualified Jenny from receiving benefits from 
her first employer. A different hearing officer found that 
Jenny's subsequent employment was "suitable" because prior 
to her separation the part-time job 4ad matured into full-time 
status. This conclusion itself was based on Jenny's failure to 
prov~ that she had not been offered full-time work. The hearing 
officer explained her conclusion as a function of the burden of 
proof, "as the testimony between claimant and the employer's 
office manager on this determinative point is at equipoise, and 
because claimant bears the burden of proof she has not over-
come." 
Jenny's appeal to the l)nemployment Commission was unsuc-
cessful. The Commission concluded that the burden of 
persuasion properly was assigned to Jenny as the claimant, 
and in any event that Jenny's accepting and later quitting even 
part-time work, at a substantially reduced salary, was still 
disqualifying. Whether Jenny was under an obljgation to accept 
the work in the first instance and whether full-time employ-
ment resulted in substantially reduced wages were held irrel-
evant. Moreover, in resQonse tp the argument that Jenny's 
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separation did not occur until after childbirth, when the part-
time employer formally removed her from its books, the Com-
mission stated "[e]ven if we were to rule, as counsel now 
argues, that claimant did not quit until she failed to return to 
work after her baby was born, we would also rule that she was 
on a maternity leave, and not eligible for benefits ... during 
the duration of that leave." 
Jenny's appeal to the courts proved successful. Eighteen 
months after her initial, compensable separation from employ-
ment, the Jefferson County Circuit Court reversed the Commis-
sion and ordered an award of benefits. The Commission's 
appeal is pending. 
Eliminating agency favoritism toward employers and bur-
eaucratic gender bias is necessary if the current anti-dis-
crimination-based system is to protect pregnant claimants like 
Jenny Brown. The first hearing officer's plain error in denying 
Jenny benefits can only be explained as a result of gender-
based and employer-based bias. Jenny's subsequent wrongful 
disqualification for quitting part-time work, though not as 
damning, further illustrates the system's inability to empathize 
with pregnant workers. 
II. AN EXTERNAL CRITIQUE: CHANGING THE RULES 
TO ACCOMMODATE PREGNANCY 
A more progressive (and better) approach is to step beyond 
the anti-discrimination model and accommodate biological 
differences between men and women. Current anti-discrimina-
tion laws foster disparate treatment in the workplace because 
they fail to account for women's reproductive capacities. Elyse 
Rosenblum and Professor Samuel lssacharoff have cogently 
argued that a centr~l reason for disparate treatment of female 
employees is the "birth effect,'' which forces women to interrupt 
their employment.8 They conclude: 
If the objective of a regulatory intervention into the 
employment market is to allow women the opportunity for 
career-wage profiles comparable to those of men, .... the 
8. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accom-
modating the Demands of Pregnancy , 94 COLOM. L. REV. 2154, 2164 (1994). 
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predictable mid-career interruptions caused by pregnancy 
must be accommodated under a regulatory scheme aimed 
at protecting the ability of women to continue their career 
work force participation through the predictable periods of 
fertility. 9 
lssacharoff's and Rosenblum's arguments are compelling. A 
systemic response to gender-based discrimination in the 
workplace is needed, one that affirmatively recognizes women's 
unique capacity for childbirth. As noted by Issacharoff and 
Rosenblum: "The simplest model to provide for maternity 
benefits is a governmental program funded through general 
revenues .... [However,] [t]here is little purpose in suggesting 
benefits approaches whose political viability approaches 
absolute zero."1° For this reason, unemployment insurance 
provides the most realistic alternative. The solution is to 
amend the unemployment laws, preferably on the federal level, 
to provide immediate unemployment benefits to otherwise 
eligible workers who leave employment because of pregnancy. 
The benefits of an insurance model are several. First and 
foremost, insurance will foster gender equality in the work-
place. More specifically, it will financially accommodate 
pregnant women who voluntarily interrupt their careers and 
are unable to privately negotiate protection. The new Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 199311 is an important piece of 
legislation, but it will benefit only those who can afford unpaid 
leaves. Those in the lower economic strata can hardly view 
unpaid leaves with optimism. Unemployment insurance also 
will protect those who are involuntarily separated from the 
workplace and find themselves either unprotected by anti-
discrimination laws or, like Jenny, unable to enforce them. In 
large measure, these are the at-risk employees who live month-
to-month, week-to-week, and even day-to-day, and who need 
the safety-net unemployment insurance affords. 
The monetary cost of extending unemployment insurance to 
pregnant workers is not necessarily minimal. Expenditures on 
the insurance side, however, are likely to be offset by savings 
in welfare dollars. Much is to be said for preventing mothers 
on the brink of poverty from falling into the well. A more 
9. Id. at 2171. 
10. Id. at 2215. 
11. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 6381- 6387, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601, 2611- 2619 (West Supp. 1994). 
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troubling and less tangible cost is the possibility of employer 
backlash against females. This can be overcome in part by not 
debiting the accounts of individual employers. 
